A base could support longer-duration naval patrols, forward-deployed ships or submarines and the rapid replenishment of surface vessels. It could also support China’s air operations, maritime surveillance and intelligence collection, increasing the tempo and reach of China’s grey-zone and coercive operations.

The scope of a base could range from a logistics hub to a full military installation similar to China’s facility in Djibouti. Critically, such bases would allow bluewater naval operations to become persistent rather than periodic. Access to ports and airfields would provide logistical depth and redundancy, giving China a reason to deploy more military and security assets to the region. In the long term, those facilities would expand China’s capacity to project both hard and soft power across the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean and around Australia and New Zealand.

Beyond physical presence, overseas bases would enhance China’s information and decision-making advantage. Continuous access to regional operational environments improves intelligence collection, situational awareness and operational planning. Pre-positioned materiel and infrastructure enable the rapid expansion of operations in response to crises, ranging from natural disasters to regional conflicts.

Even absent conflict or crises, the presence of a base would mean China operating military assets far closer to other nations than ever before. Regional states would be required to significantly adjust their military posture and planning—a costly endeavour for any state.

Bases carry a powerful psychological and signalling effect. China’s basing in proximate locations would increase fear and influence domestic debates. It would reinforce perceptions that any confrontation with China would carry significant cost and would support Beijing’s hollow narrative about China’s ‘inevitable’ rise. That would increase pressure on states to prioritise economic engagement rather than contest Beijing’s challenge to the regional order.

That dynamic could also create tension within regional alliances and frameworks. Divergent national priorities (economic versus security) may weaken collective responses and gradually fragment regional security arrangements even without overt coercion.

A base would also expand China’s ability to shape regional rules, norms and institutions over time. Operating from abroad would allow China to more actively challenge existing maritime rules and freedom-of-navigation principles—a pattern already evident in the East and South China seas. Gradually, such operations could normalise activities previously viewed as provocative, providing China with both leverage and legitimacy for more assertive actions that advance its strategic interests.

A fully operational base represents a force multiplier in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. China’s naval, air and potentially space assets could be deployed in advance, enabling options for coercion, surveillance and rapid escalation that were previously unavailable. For countries like Australia, that compresses response timelines and necessitates fundamental adjustments to force posture, including forward presence, surveillance and defence planning.

The presence of a base would also exert strategic pressure, discouraging involvement in conflicts or constraining options for hosting allied forces.

Finally, the combination of forward basing, pre-positioned assets and higher tempo operations amplifies the risks of miscalculation or unintended escalation, while providing China with a strategic lever to influence regional decision-making even in the absence of conflict.