Across all three regions, China’s activity is becoming more regular, more capable and more geographically distributed. Naval task groups, CCG vessels, research platforms and maritime militia assets are increasingly operating alongside regional and partner forces.

The result is a denser operating environment. Encounters that were once rare are becoming routine. Surveillance, shadowing and signalling activities are no longer exceptional, but are becoming part of the baseline. That reduces warning time, increases the complexity of day-to-day operations and raises the risk of miscalculation.

China’s approach relies on operating below the threshold of conflict. Activities such as seabed mapping, intelligence collection and live-fire exercises are lawful, but strategically purposeful. Individually, they’re difficult to contest. Collectively, they normalise China’s presence, help to build Beijing’s understanding and seek to shape regional environments. Over time, they also raise the threshold for response, as actions that might once have triggered concern risk becoming accepted as routine. Such activities place pressure on military readiness and stretch the ability of states to respond.

China’s approach to the grey zone is not unconstrained. Where shaping activities are resisted or prove insufficient, they can be reinforced by more overt demonstrations of hard power. China’s behaviour around Taiwan and in the South China Sea illustrates how pressure can intensify, from persistent grey-zone activity to more coercive military actions. Those dynamics offer a warning for regions further afield and underscore how China’s actions seek to gradually reshape regional rules and norms in ways that favour its interests.

Australia and the Southwest Pacific have long benefited from distance as a strategic buffer. China’s expanding military and security presence is eroding that advantage. More frequent naval deployments and increased submarine activity beyond Southeast Asia, combined with persistent surveillance of maritime approaches, will reduce the protective effect of geography. The PLAN’s emergence as a capable bluewater navy enables Beijing to project power into areas that were previously beyond its sustained reach.

That presence carries a psychological dimension. China’s live-fire exercises and visible operations around Australia signal both capability and intent, shaping perceptions of regional power and creating a sense of proximity that didn’t previously exist. They’re designed in part to influence domestic debates, pressing countries to weigh economic engagement with Beijing against resisting its regional advances. Diverging approaches to managing China can complicate coordination among allies and partners, contributing to the fragmentation of collective regional security responses.

PICs and Indian Ocean countries are central to this evolving environment. China’s engagement offers economic and security benefits but also introduces new strategic pressures. Many regional states will continue to hedge, seeking to maximise opportunity while avoiding alignment. However, as China’s presence deepens, the space for manoeuvre will narrow. The risk isn’t uniform alignment, but possible fragmentation, as states adopt diverging approaches to external partners and security relationships.