Demand for security cooperation across the Indo-Pacific is growing. Pacific Island countries, Southeast Asian states and Indian Ocean partners are seeking support to manage maritime security, protect sovereignty and build resilience. Most are not looking to align with China, but to preserve agency and expand their options. Australia and like-minded and capable maritime powers including the littoral countries have an opportune moment to take ownership of the region and shape it in a way that is rules-based, non-hegemonic and stable.

Regional powers, such as Australia, India and Japan, are well placed to assist. Long-standing relationships, geographic proximity and a track record of cooperation provide a strong foundation. But in the face of rapid change, middle powers will need to be bold and work together in flexible and reinforcing ways.

Expanding maritime domain awareness, supporting regional policing and coast guard capabilities and deepening defence cooperation remain central. These efforts are most effective when framed as supporting sovereignty and regional priorities, rather than as elements of strategic competition.

Defence and security cooperation should also be closely coordinated with other assistance packages. China does not wield influence through security means alone, so Australia and its partners need to coordinate defence and security cooperation alongside diplomatic engagement, development assistance and institutional support.

China’s expanding presence is prompting greater alignment among regional states. Shared concerns about maritime security, sovereignty and stability are creating new opportunities to strengthen regional frameworks and expand multilateral cooperation.

There is a unique opportunity to build a more networked regional architecture, one that deepens cooperation and strengthens regional agency. Minilateral groupings, issue-based coalitions and flexible coordination mechanisms can complement formal institutions, allowing partners to align where interests converge.

For Australia, this means deepening engagement with Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Indian Ocean partners in ways that reinforce regional institutions rather than bypass them. Supporting the resilience and effectiveness of these institutions, particularly in areas such as maritime governance, legal frameworks and crisis response, will be important.

A more contested environment increases the value of presence. Regular military deployments, joint exercises and coordinated operations build familiarity, strengthen partnerships and demonstrate commitment. For Australia, this includes strengthening its surveillance posture, increasing naval and air activity and expanding access arrangements with regional partners.

However, presence alone is insufficient. The strategic effect of military activity lies in the combination of presence, access and denial. Access agreements, logistics networks and forward operating arrangements enable sustained operations, while the ability to constrain adversary freedom of action reinforces deterrence.

Interoperability between partners, such as Australia, Japan, India and the United States, remains a central priority. These efforts do more than signal capability. They shape operational realities, improve the ability to operate in complex environments and contribute to a balance in which coercive actions become more difficult and costly.

China’s grey-zone activities highlight vulnerabilities in infrastructure, supply chains and information systems. Addressing these vulnerabilities is both a defensive necessity and a strategic opportunity.

Resilience must be understood broadly. It includes not only undersea cables, energy flows and critical infrastructure, but also governance frameworks, legal systems and information environments that are resistant to external pressure. Strengthening these systems reduces exposure to coercion while reinforcing national sovereignty.

This is not solely a domestic task. Supporting resilience in regional states, through capacity building, technical assistance and institutional partnerships, can build trust and reinforce stability across the Indo-Pacific. Effective competition will require integrating defence and security efforts with economic, technological and informational tools. National security is no longer confined to the military domain. It encompasses the full range of government activity, from infrastructure investment to digital standards and supply chain resilience.

China’s influence is also shaped by its role in infrastructure development, technology ecosystems and regional economies. These domains create long-term patterns of dependence that can translate into strategic leverage and basing opportunities.

Australia and its partners should deepen efforts to provide credible alternatives. Transparent infrastructure financing, secure digital ecosystems and diversified supply chains reduce vulnerability to coercion while supporting sustainable development. These efforts are most effective when coordinated across partners, reinforcing collective impact and offering practical choices to regional states.

As Chinese activity becomes more persistent, the importance of norms and rules increases. Upholding freedom of navigation, transparency in security agreements and respect for sovereignty will be central to maintaining stability.

However, norms are not self-sustaining. They must be reinforced through consistent practice, sustained presence and, where necessary, collective pushback. Australia and its partners can play a leading role through active diplomacy, regional institutions and practical cooperation.

Supporting organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum, while deepening engagement with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean partners, will be critical to ensuring that regional norms remain relevant and resilient in a more contested environment.