Pressure Points part 1 analyses the Chinese military's use of air and maritime coercion to enforce Beijing's excessive territorial claims and advance China's security and defence interests in the Indo-Pacific.  

The project highlights and analyses open-source data, military imagery, satellite footage, official government responses and other resources to provide the public with a reliable and accurate account of the PLA's regional activity from its excessive claims to intercept tactics. It also analyses the PLA's unsafe military interactions with a range of countries (including the US, Australia, Canada, the Philippines and the Netherlands) and looks at the different ways in which countries do or don't use their military forces to challenge China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea.

This project also provides governments - especially regional and global militaries - with policy recommendations to consider. These focus on enhancing transparency, building and deepening networks of like-minded countries and demonstrating perseverance.  

We acknowledge that China also uses other organisations within the PLA (such as the coastguard and maritime militia) to coerce and deter others; however, this project focuses specifically on the actions of China’s military.

Readers can click here to download a PDF which contains the full text from this website.

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Pressure Points part 2 explores Beijing’s growing use of military coercion against Taiwan, detailing events around Asia’s most volatile flashpoint.  

The analysis draws on open-source data, satellite imagery, military imagery, governmental reporting and other resources to deliver an accurate and comprehensive picture of China’s approach.

It examines how Beijing frames its claim to Taiwan, the coercive and military tools it increasingly wields to enforce that claim, how Taipei is responding to mounting pressure, and how other governments are managing the growing risk of confrontation. It also details potential scenarios that President Xi may pursue to forcibly unify Taiwan. The result is a concise and interactive account of one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential strategic landscapes.

The project also provides policy recommendations for governments, especially regional militaries and likeminded nations. These recommendations center on improving transparency of operations, enhancing multi-national coordination among like-minded states, strengthening resilience (military and civilian) in Taiwan, and maintaining sustained commitment in the face of persistent Chinese pressure.

The scope of this study acknowledges that China uses a broad range of tools (including cyber intrusions, economic coercion and diplomatic isolation). However, the primary focus of this project is on the action of China’s military and its implications for Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait and the wider Indo-Pacific strategic environment.

Readers can click here to download a PDF which contains the full text from this website.

Pressure Points part 3 examines China’s expanding defence and security presence beyond the First Island Chain and across the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and Australia’s maritime approaches over the last decade. Using a range of tools, including a growing bluewater navy, paramilitary forces and localised policing cooperation arrangements, China ‘is steadily building a pattern of access, presence and influence that’s reshaping regional security dynamics.’ China’s long-term strategy of normalisation aims to create a region in which ‘its access is expected, and its influence is embedded.’

To achieve this, China has adopted distinct approaches in the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the immediate vicinity of Australia and New Zealand.

In the Southwest Pacific, a strategic rather than an economic lens predominates. China’s military footprint is limited, and its naval presence has until recently foregrounded non-combat forces: hospital ships, training vessels and goodwill port calls. Policing cooperation has taken the central position in a broader security posture—including recent demonstrations of hard power—which aims to further isolate Taiwan and to diminish the region’s strategic potential for the US in the event of a major conflict.

In the Indian Ocean, China’s deep energy dependence on the Middle East drove the initial establishment of a PLA Navy capability for sustained far-seas operations. China’s consolidation over the past decade has evolved from counter-piracy missions to submarine deployments, a base at Djibouti in 2017, exercises with Pakistan and Sri Lanka, increased arms sales, research-vessel activity and dual-use infrastructure at Gwadar and Hambantota.

In Australia’s maritime approaches, Canberra and Wellington have seen China’s security engagement undergo a fundamental shift—from a confidence-building approach to a more aggressive stance. Over the course of Xi Jinping’s presidency, China’s actions in the near region have seen sustained efforts to normalise proximity and demonstrate high-end combat power.

The changing regional security circumstances also open strategic opportunities for the region's democratic partners, which are detailed in the report.

Readers can click here to download a PDF which contains the full text from this website.

Recent ASPI work on China’s air and maritime coercion

• ‍China drops flares ahead of RAAF plane, sends ships to Australia’s northern approaches‍
• Military challenges to Beijing’s South China Sea claims are increasing
• China’s navy sends a steady drumbeat of ships around Australia
• ‍Trick or treat? China comes a-knocking at Indonesia’s front door‍
• All together now: Southeast Asia must act collectively in the South China Sea‍

Center of Strategic & International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative‍

• Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

Recent ASPI work on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait

• ‍Still not confident enough: China isn’t likely to move on Taiwan in 2025
• ‍Limited quarantine is China’s likely first move in subduing Taiwan
• ‍Floating piers and sinking hopes: China’s logistics challenge in invading Taiwan
• ‍Which countries challenge China’s claim to the Taiwan Strait?

Recent ASPI work on China in the Pacific and Indian oceans

• ‍China’s naval deployment should invigorate Australia’s election debate
• ‍China’s ships near Australia. Challenges in the South China Sea. Get used to it
• ‍With Chinese warships nearby, Australia needs to step up as a maritime power
• ‍China’s missile test demonstrates disrespect for Pacific

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is an independent, non-partisan think tank that produces expert and timely advice for Australian and global leaders. It is a leading Indo-Pacific think-tank on defence, national security and technology issues. ASPI generates new ideas for policymakers, allowing them to make better-informed decisions. Find out more about our work here.

Pressure Points was created by ASPI’s Defence Strategy and National Security program. The program focuses on broad strategic policy settings, global and regional security environments, the operational needs of the Australian Defence Force, the development of our defence capabilities, and issues associated with defence funding and budgets. Over the years ASPI has made nationally recognised contributions in all those fields, and they remain central to ASPI’s work agenda even as it has expanded to embrace new programs and responsibilities.

ASPI was established by the Australian Government in 2001 and remains partially funded by the Department of Defence. It receives funding from governments, businesses and civil society groups. Details of our funding sources are available here.

The opinions and recommendations on this website are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

Funding 

No dedicated funding was received to support this research project.

This website was created by Joe Keary, former Senior Analyst within ASPI's Defence Strategy and National Security team. Dr Raji Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen were co-authors alongside Joe Keary for Pressure Points part 3. We would like to thank all ASPI colleagues, and the many external reviewers, who have provided feedback on this work.

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