3.1.1

China’s military diplomacy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

China’s military diplomacy and security engagement have evolved over time

China’s military diplomacy and security engagement have evolved significantly over the past five decades, especially since Xi Jinping took office in 2013. Unpacking that evolution helps to explain not only the transformation of China’s military, but also the changing way Beijing views its place in the international system and the role that defence and security engagement now plays in advancing China’s strategic objectives across the Indo-Pacific. From the late Mao era, particularly after the Sino-Soviet split and during the rapprochement with the US in the early 1970s, China increasingly sought diplomatic legitimacy and integration into major international institutions. That resulted in the People’s Republic of China replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the United Nations in 1971.

Under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, China pursued deeper integration and reassurance, embedding itself within the international order as economic development became the central national priority. By the early 2000s, following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and amid a period of US strategic distraction after 9/11, Beijing increasingly began using its growing economic and military power to expand its global interests and strategic influence.

Under Xi Jinping, that trajectory has accelerated. China’s now seeking not only to expand its presence within the existing order, but increasingly to shape regional security dynamics, norms and institutions in ways more closely aligned with Beijing’s interests and a more Sino-centric vision of the Indo-Pacific.

What underpins China’s evolution

China’s evolving posture has reflected the convergence of expanding economic interests, improving military capability and growing political confidence in Beijing’s ability to shape external environments. What began as cautious diplomatic reassurance and limited military outreach has evolved into sustained bluewater naval deployments, overseas basing, strategic access arrangements, defence and policing partnerships, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, security assistance programs and efforts to shape regional security norms.

Together, those activities enable China to build familiarity with operating environments, deepen relationships with regional partners, normalise a sustained Chinese security presence far from home waters and progressively expand the PLA’s operational reach. Under Xi Jinping, defence and security engagement has become a central component of statecraft, supporting China’s ambitions to safeguard its overseas interests, expand strategic presence, strengthen political influence and shape the region’s future security order.

Chinese leaders on defence and security engagement

Understanding how China’s leaders have framed defence diplomacy and security engagement provides important context for assessing China’s current activities across the Pacific and Indian oceans and where they may lead in the future. What emerges is a long-term pattern in which China’s growing capability and ambition have enabled progressively more assertive forms of strategic engagement across the Indo-Pacific.

Deng Xiaoping
1978 – 1992
Jiang Zemin
1992 – 2002
Hu Jintao
2002 – 2012
Xi Jinping
2012 – present
1978 – 1992

Deng Xiaoping

Deng Xiaoping framed defence activity as subordinate to economic development and diplomacy. The PLA was tasked with supporting a favourable external environment for national development. That rhetoric stressed reassurance and non-adventurism while avoiding any emphasis on overseas basing or power projection. It’s also true that China’s capabilities were probably insufficient to consider foreign bases at that time.

Deng’s approach opened space for limited defence exchanges that helped to normalise diplomatic ties. Activities included modest officer exchanges, goodwill ship visits and technical assistance. China didn’t conduct any sustained overseas deployments.

1992 – 2002

Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin emphasised 'peaceful coexistence' and military diplomacy as part of China’s diplomacy. His public rhetoric struck a tone of transparency, confidence-building, and institutional engagement. Strategic documents in this period reiterated China’s defensive posture.

This helped reassure neighbours after the events of 1989 and supported China’s integration into regional security institutions. During this time, China expanded its attaché networks and conducted more port calls. Early contributions were made to UN peacekeeping missions, and the PLA started to conduct training exchanges with partners.

2002 – 2012

Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao introduced and institutionalised the language of 'diversified military tasks', with the PLA undertaking peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), anti-piracy, and non-combatant evacuation activities. Leaders cast these as contributions to international security and protection of China’s growing overseas interests.  

Framing PLAN operations as global public goods helped to justify China’s far-seas deployments politically and diplomatically. In 2008 the PLAN began anti-piracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden which opened space for new logistics and port-access arrangements. During this period, China used its military diplomacy to learn how to be a modern force, exploring different structural options and joint operations.

2012 – present

Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping frames military diplomacy as a central component of state diplomacy. The PLA must expand strategic presence, 'tell China’s military story well,' and improve the ability to safeguard China’s overseas interests.

During this period, the PLA has sought to normalise overseas basing, conduct bluewater operations and expand security agreements. China has opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, sent regular PLAN task groups into the Indian Ocean and Pacific, expanded military and police training as well as security assistance in Pacific island states, and deepened access relationships across the Indian Ocean.  

China’s Indo-Pacific security engagement evolved across four distinct periods

Building on the analysis above, we can see that China’s Indo-Pacific military and security engagement has evolved across four distinct periods.

The first, during the Mao era, was characterised by limited military diplomacy. It concluded with Beijing entering the United Nations as it sought inclusion into the existing international order.

The second, spanning the late 1970s to the early 2000s, saw cautious expansion in defence diplomacy as China prioritised economic development and deeper integration into global institutions. It culminated in accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.

The third period, from the mid-2000s to 2013, involved a growing operational expansion of Chinese military activity beyond East Asia. As China’s economic and strategic interests expanded, the PLA increasingly sought access, operational experience and international influence.

The fourth period, under Xi Jinping, has involved a far more assertive and sustained effort to expand China’s strategic presence, reshape regional security dynamics and promote norms and institutions more closely aligned with Beijing’s interests. China is no longer simply integrating into the international order; it’s increasingly seeking to shape that order in ways that reflect its growing power and ambitions.

Period 1: Mao era (pre-1976)

China seeks inclusion in the existing international order

Pacific Islands

Almost no PLA engagement.

Indian Ocean

No PLA-N deployments; relations limited to political diplomacy with select South Asian partners, the most important of which is Pakistan.

Australia & NZ

Diplomatic relations open from mid-1970s; minimal military exchanges.

Period 2: Late 1970s – early 2000s

China’s deeper integration into the international order

Pacific Islands

PLA provides non-lethal military aid, conducts officer training, early PLAN port calls and goodwill visits. Competition with Taiwan shapes outreach.

Indian Ocean

China establishes diplomatic ties across the region. The PLA conducts arms sales (Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and strategic interest in sea lanes grows, but no PLA deployments.

Australia & NZ

The PLA institutionalises defence dialogue, conducts port visits and officer exchanges.

Period 3: Mid-2000s – 2016

China expands its global interests

Pacific Islands

The PLA conducts more frequent port calls, engages in HADR assistance (e.g. 2004 tsunami), capacity building and training. The PLA's profile steadily increases.

Indian Ocean

The PLA begins Gulf of Aden anti-piracy deployments in 2008, marking its first sustained far-seas operational campaign. It establishes port access and logistics arrangements.

Australia & NZ

High levels of engagement, especially in the economic sector, continue. But strategic unease grows as the PLA modernises without transparency or strategic reassurance. That the PLA is also beginning to develop the ability to project power started to influence Australia’s defence thinking, especially regarding its northern and western maritime approaches.

Period 4: 2016 – present

China seeks to reshape the international order

Pacific Islands

The PLA intensifies security assistance through police/military training, large equipment donations and more frequent PLAN port calls. The Solomon Islands security agreement (2022) and broader Pacific outreach raise the prospect of basing or extended access.

Indian Ocean

The PLA establishes a support base in Djibouti (2017). China expands access arrangements (Gwadar, Hambantota), conducts regular long-range patrols, joint exercises, and evacuations (Libya, Yemen). PLAN rotations and surface action groups operate year-round.

Australia & NZ

There's a sharp reduction in defence cooperation with Australia during China’s 2020–2023 diplomatic freeze. China begins a regular pattern of contested maritime interactions. PLAN task groups begin to circumnavigate Australia.

China’s excessive claims and sensitive areas

Next chapter:

3.1.2

China’s security ambitions under President Xi