The earliest naval deployments in the region took place in December 2008 with China sending a naval task force (two destroyers and one supply ship) on a counter-piracy mission to the Gulf of Aden. This deployment helped the PLAN to develop a more sustained, rotational presence in the IOR along with capability development for the broader purposes of securing its trade and energy transport corridors as well as augmenting its strategic influence and footprint in the broader littoral regions.

For instance, China sent a submarine along with the anti-piracy task force in 2014 to the Gulf of Aden, and the next year, a nuclear-powered submarine. These were hardly suitable for anti-piracy missions, but it was a clear indication of China pushing its strategic goals under the pretext of regional public good missions. China’s strategic push beyond its immediate waters was inevitable given its expanding strategic, economic and energy interests, pushing Beijing to shift steadily from a coastal 'brownwater' navy to a global 'bluewater' maritime power. This led China to formalize a new 'Far Sea strategy' in 2015.

China’s new Far Sea strategy began to see a more proactive deployment of its aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. The growing importance of maritime security in China’s strategic thinking has manifested in its investment, capability mix and dual-use infrastructure projects in the IOR, in addition to enhanced naval deployments and strengthened maritime domain awareness. Securing its trade and energy transport corridors is undeniably important to China, but the enhanced capability mix and new strategy are also meant to be a power-projection tool and a means to counter Indian, US and allied roles and influence in the IOR and beyond.

In the post-2016 phase, China started establishing basing facilities. That included a semi-permanent presence in Djibouti (from 2017) as well as exploring potential facilities in Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. China’s takeover of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka in 2017 meant that it was able to achieve its long-term goal of establishing a foothold in the Indian Ocean.

The post-2016 period also included a spike in the number of military exercises with Pakistan as well as extended deployments by China in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. That phase also saw an increase in arms sales to Pakistan, making it a more capable naval player in the western Indian Ocean. China’s oceanographic research activities and other engagements have also raised alarm in the region because they’ve involved surveillance and intelligence-gathering vessels.

In the past decade, China has clearly shifted from a pure economic and infrastructure-development focus in the IOR to a more proactive presence using dual-use (commercial and military) facilities so as to establish a near-permanent strategic footprint in the region.

China’s narrative on the IOR has also become more assertive, questioning India’s influence and that of the US and its allies. The ‘Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean’ statements regularly made by Chinese officials and academics are part of this narrative-building exercise. The spike in the number of military exercises with Sri Lanka during the past decade (as can be seen in the interactive map in the beginning of this section) is part of an effort to assert China’s ‘rightful’ place in the IOR.

Even as China has made a shift towards a more prominent presence in the IOR with a strategic underpinning through ports and dual-use facilities, one troubling feature is the significant growth in China’s distant fishing fleets. China is reported to have the world’s largest such fleet in terms of catch volume and fleet size. That has resulted in massive resource exploitation and environmental damage. Many of the smaller Indian Ocean littoral states are bearing the brunt but are unable to push back effectively due to their relatively weak enforcement mechanisms.

China’s military presence in the IOR has been growing. Beijing has enhanced its presence in the region through the establishment of its base in Djibouti and in IOR ports despite its public criticism of the US presence in the previous decades. Some of those establishments are dual-use facilities, strengthening China’s logistics and intelligence networks.

Djibouti is China’s only acknowledged military base in the IOR. Originally begun as a counter-piracy effort, the base is today capable of supporting PLAN operations in the region. Similarly, China has assisted in building a seaport and airport facilities in Gwadar in Pakistan.

Gwadar also provides China with a land link through the Karakoram Highway, although no PLAN facility has been reported. The infrastructure appears to be economically unviable for a purely civilian facility. Jiwani is another port facility even closer to the Iran border. Although some reports have suggested that China has an interest in the facility, there’s been no confirmation. Jiwani isn’t yet a formal military base but, given the location of the base and China’s goals for an extensive presence in the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and major international maritime choke-points, it could be expected to proceed with this base possibly at a later date. Both Gwadar and Jiwani are close to the Strait of Hormuz.

Hambantota is a Sri Lankan port on the southern coast of the island, and it sits astride Indian Ocean sea lanes of communication. China has invested heavily in the port, and its tracking and research vessels have docked there.