China has maintained a strong interest in the Indian Ocean for several decades. China became a net importer of oil in the early 1990s, mostly from the Middle East and transported through the Indian Ocean to support its growing economy. China's naval presence in the region has evolved in parallel, from being a marginal player in the early 2000s, to the major maritime power it is today. Nevertheless, China maintained the cover of economic and research interests driving its approach to Indian Ocean. For instance, in November 2011, the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA) signed a 15-year agreement with the International Seabed Authority, which granted China exclusive rights to explore 10,000 sq km of seabed in southwest Indian Ocean, off the coast of Africa, for polymetallic sulphide ore deposits.
While securing its energy interests and trade routes have been key drivers, Beijing’s Indian Ocean policy goes far beyond this. China’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean were, for instance, captured in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) publicly released in 2013. The document referred to China’s commercial interests, but it also highlighted the possibility of conflict, great power competition and rivalry in the region and added that 'no single regional power or world power, including the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, can control the Indian Ocean by itself in the future world.'
China’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) have grown steadily since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. An obvious consideration is countering US naval presence and dominance over the Indian Ocean. Another important strategic consideration is possibly related to India’s position in the region, as it does not want New Delhi to assert control over the Indian Ocean. This has become particularly challenging since 2015 when India’s own approach to the Indian Ocean began to change.
In March 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a couple of important speeches in Seychelles and Mauritius. He highlighted major changes in India’s approach to Indian Ocean security and diplomacy, which included welcoming close partnership with extra-regional powers including the US, Australia, Japan, France and others to engage in security dialogues, military exercises and defence exchanges. This was a clear appreciation of the significant capacity deficit on the part of India to manage the Indian Ocean on its own, particularly in the context of China wanting to establish a bigger presence and influence in the region. China seeks to establish maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean Region through a number of tools and actions, all of which have begun to shift the military balance in China’s favour.
China’s growing presence in the broader Indian Ocean Region was initially couched as contributing to the global public good of protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and anti-piracy missions. Using such regional/global public good narrative, China managed to expand its footprint in the IOR, with a key goal of countering Indian and US and allied influence. It further enhanced its positioning in the IOR through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Road strategies, leading to establishment of longer-term naval presence in places such as Djibouti, thereby augmenting its naval, submarine and research vessel deployments well beyond its immediate waters.
