China has maintained a strong interest in the Indian Ocean for several decades. In the early 1990s, it became a net importer of oil, mostly from the Middle East and transported through the Indian Ocean, to support its growing economy. China’s naval presence in the region has evolved in parallel, from that of a marginal player in the early 2000s to the major maritime power it is today.

Nevertheless, China maintained the cover of economic and research interests driving its approach to the Indian Ocean. For instance, in November 2011, the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association signed a 15-year agreement with the International Seabed Authority, which granted China exclusive rights to explore 10,000 square kilometres of seabed in the southwest Indian Ocean, off the coast of Africa, for polymetallic sulphide ore deposits.

While securing its energy interests and trade routes have been key drivers, Beijing’s Indian Ocean policy goes far beyond that. Its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean were, for instance, captured in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which was publicly released in 2013. The document referred to China’s commercial interests, but it also highlighted the possibility of conflict, great-power competition and rivalry in the region and added that ‘no single regional power or world power, including the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, can control the Indian Ocean by itself in the future world.’

While China’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) have remained consistent, its growing power has allowed Xi Jinping to act on those interests after he took office in 2013. An obvious consideration is countering US naval presence and dominance over the Indian Ocean. Another important strategic consideration is possibly related to India’s position in the region, as Beijing doesn’t want New Delhi to assert control over the Indian Ocean. This has become particularly challenging since 2015, when India’s own approach to the Indian Ocean began to change.

In March 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave two important speeches in Seychelles and Mauritius. He highlighted major changes in India’s approach to Indian Ocean security and diplomacy, which included welcoming close partnerships with extra-regional powers including the US, Australia, Japan, France and others to engage in security dialogues, military exercises and defence exchanges. This was a clear appreciation of the significant capacity deficit on the part of India to manage the Indian Ocean on its own, particularly in the context of China wanting to establish a bigger presence and influence in the region.