Up until 2017, both Australia and New Zealand approached military engagement with China as a stabilising and confidence-building mechanism. Each sought to reduce strategic uncertainty through regular dialogue, professional exchanges and limited practical cooperation, reflecting a shared belief that transparency and familiarity could moderate China’s behaviour.

For Australia, that engagement was consistent. Senior and working-level dialogues were institutionalised, bilateral and multilateral exercises occurred annually, and personnel exchanges were routine. Army exercises such as Kowari and Pandaroo, combined with PLAN participation in Exercise Kakadu, embedded the PLA within Australia’s regional security ecosystem.

New Zealand’s engagement was smaller in scale but also regular. China–New Zealand defence dialogues continued uninterrupted until 2019, complemented by professional military education exchanges and working-level visits. Wellington also pursued functional cooperation, particularly in HADR—an area that aligned closely with New Zealand’s defence identity and South Pacific focus. Joint exercises such as Cooperation Spirit, Tropic Twilight and the landmark Skytrain18 airlift exercise reflected a deliberate emphasis on non-combat cooperation.

At sea, both countries hosted China’s naval visits that were framed as goodwill diplomacy. Frigates, escort task groups and training vessels called at Brisbane, Sydney, Auckland and Wellington. In New Zealand’s case, the visits were often tied to commemorative events, such as the Royal New Zealand Navy’s 75th anniversary, reinforcing a narrative of professional normalcy.

From 2017 onward, Australia and New Zealand began to diverge in their experiences with China.

In Australia, the breakdown was abrupt and adversarial. Canberra’s growing concern over foreign interference, followed by sweeping legislative reforms, collided with Beijing’s political expectations. Australia also stepped up its engagement across the Southwest Pacific, particularly in areas such as defence engagement, critical-infrastructure protection and foreign interference, in response to regional concerns about what China was doing.

As US–China strategic competition intensified, Australia was recast by Beijing as an active strategic problem rather than a hedging middle power. The result was a program of sustained coercion from China, including punitive trade measures and a diplomatic freeze. Defence engagement collapsed. Exercises ceased after 2019, personnel exchanges ended, and senior military dialogue froze for several years.

New Zealand experienced a cooling of relations with China. Defence engagement slowed during Covid-19 and amid rising geopolitical tension, but the dialogue architecture remained somewhat intact. Wellington avoided the sharp political confrontation seen in Canberra and continued to frame engagement with China as risk management rather than an endorsement of China’s position. That allowed defence dialogues to resume earlier and more smoothly than in Australia’s case, although that hasn’t entirely softened China’s behaviour towards New Zealand.

As formal engagement receded, particularly with Australia, China increasingly relied on military presence as a tool of influence.

From 2017 onward, PLAN intelligence-collection ships routinely monitored Exercise Talisman Sabre. In 2021 and 2023, multiple intelligence vessels were deployed simultaneously, operating close to Australia’s exclusive economic zone and sensitive infrastructure. Those deployments were lawful, persistent and unmistakably deliberate, serving intelligence, training and signalling functions.

New Zealand experienced a lighter but still notable form of presence. China’s naval visits continued through 2019, including the arrival of the training ship Qi Jiguang in Wellington. Space-tracking vessels such as Yuan Wang 5 also made port calls, underscoring New Zealand’s role as a useful logistics and replenishment node for China’s global operations, particularly space and missile support missions.

Crucially, New Zealand didn’t experience the same level of overt intelligence collection activity near exercises or critical facilities as Australia did. That may reflect the fact that New Zealand wasn’t exercising on the same scale as Australia and thus was likely to be considered as a lesser threat by China.

From 2020 onward, China expanded its presence through research and survey vessels, in a pattern evident around both Australia and New Zealand.

In Australian waters, ships such as Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Tansuo Yi Hao conducted deepwater surveys near Western Australia, Christmas Island and the southern maritime approaches. Those missions generated data relevant to submarine operations and undersea infrastructure, while maintaining a civilian or scientific facade. Further research vessel presence around Australia is likely; however, due to the difficulties of tracking and identifying those vessels, the complete picture can’t be captured accurately.

New Zealand’s experience was more ambiguous. In 2025, China’s maritime research vessel Tansuo Yi Hao undertook a joint deep-sea scientific mission with New Zealand researchers in the Puysegur Trench. That collaboration was legitimate and transparent, yet it also highlighted the dual-use nature of China’s oceanographic capabilities. Following the New Zealand mission, the vessel transited along southern Australia and entered parts of Australia’s exclusive economic zone, linking scientific cooperation directly to China’s broader regional presence.

China’s security influence extended ashore in both countries, although again with differences.

In Australia, formal Australian Federal Police–Ministry of Public Security cooperation arrangements enabled China’s police deployments between 2015 and 2019. Over time, those arrangements became politically untenable as evidence emerged of coercive behaviour linked to China’s Operation Fox Hunt, unlawful police stations and diaspora pressure. By 2019, Australia had effectively terminated sanctioned Chinese policing activity, viewing it as incompatible with sovereignty and rule-of-law norms.

In New Zealand, law-enforcement cooperation remained more restrained. While joint frameworks existed, there were no confirmed cases of Chinese police exercising policing powers. Reports of an alleged overseas police ‘contact point’ in Auckland in 2022 raised concerns, but the issue never escalated to the same degree as in Australia, again reflecting New Zealand’s lower profile in Beijing.

The 2025 circumnavigation by PLAN Task Group 107 marked a turning point for both countries. The deployment of a Type 055 cruiser alongside escort and replenishment vessels through waters near Australia and New Zealand represented a dramatic increase in China’s naval signalling.

For Australia, the message was unmistakable: China can deploy high-end combat power persistently around the continent, across both the Pacific and Indian Ocean approaches. For New Zealand, inclusion in the task group’s operating pattern reinforced that geographical distance no longer insulates the South Pacific from great-power naval competition.

From 2016 to the present, China’s defence and security engagement with Australia and New Zealand has evolved from partnership to presence. Australia’s experience has been sharper and more confrontational, marked by coercion, intelligence collection and power demonstration. New Zealand’s has been steadier and more muted, characterised by continued dialogue and selective cooperation.

Yet the underlying logic is the same. Where confidence building once served China’s interests, Beijing embraced it. But, as China’s capabilities improved and its objectives evolved, Beijing shifted to a pattern of persistent military presence, dual-use activity and strategic signalling. Together, Australia and New Zealand illustrate how China now seeks influence less through engagement and more through the normalisation of proximity.