Taiwan’s military preparations

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

Taiwan is arguably more outmatched and outgunned by China’s military than at any time since 1949. However, Taiwan is responding, albeit with far fewer resources. In 2024, President Lai appointed Wellington Koo as Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense, a bold and exceedingly rare move, given Koo’s lack of prior military experience.  

Traditionally, Presidents have appointed former generals to this position, valuing their military experience. However, former defense ministers have been criticised for adhering to outdated KMT mindsets that favour conventional warfare and big, flashy equipment. Such a minister today would be constrained in their ability to align military reforms with increasingly urgent government priorities.

Koo appears to be breaking with former conventions and despite internal challenges and resistance to reform, he is moving in a positive direction. He has made progress in reforming Taiwan's military, including by improving military training and enhancing asymmetric capabilities.

Preparing the force

Training the force

Outdated drills have been retired: Bayonet charges and goose-stepping are gone, replaced by realistic, combat-focused training.

Revamped Han Kuang exercises: Taiwan’s largest war games now span:

  • 14 days of computer-aided simulations
  • 10 days of live-fire combat drills
  • 24-hour brigade-level endurance tests, including night combat

Urban warfare facilities are under construction and drone operations are now part of core training, reflecting the modern battlefield.

‍

Strengthening Conscription and the Reserves

In 2023, Taiwan reinstated one-year conscription, reversing the 2013 cut to four months.

  • New conscripts now train with advanced systems, such as Stinger and Javelin missiles, gaining real capability in asymmetric warfare.

The 1.66 million-strong reserve force is receiving:

Civil-Military Integration

Old civil defense drills, once symbolic siren tests, have been replaced with realistic, city-wide resilience exercises:

  • 7-Eleven stores act as emergency supply hubs
  • Citizens rehearse roles in communications, logistics, and emergency response.

Civil society groups like Forward Alliance offer training in:

  • First aid, crisis survival skills
  • Civil defense readiness for all ages.

The All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (est. 2021) oversees this effort, coordinating:

  • Reserve call-ups
  • Air raid shelter readiness
  • Essential stockpiles for prolonged crises.

Indigenous weapons

Indigenous weapons development includes:

Amphibious assault capabilities, such as the type 075 amphibious assault ships which can deploy helicopters, landing craft, and PLA marines; key assets for a potential island invasion.  

Air and missile defences, such as the Tien Kung III which would be used to intercept PLA fighters and bombers and incoming ballistic missiles.

New classes of missile corvettes, such as the Tuo Chiang-class, which are highly maneuverable, stealthy platforms built to deliver strikes from Taiwan’s littoral zones to complicate PLA maritime operations.

Indigenous submarines, such as the Hai Kun-Class (expected to be commissioned into service in 2025), which will seek to disrupt PLA naval logistics, intercept amphibious forces, and provide a hidden layer of defence.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as the Cardinal Short-Range UAVs. Drawing on lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine, Taiwan is ramping up the production of drones and has plans to develop new drone units in preparation for a potential PLA invasion.

Sea mines and mine laying vessels, such as the Min Jiang-class minelayers, that are capable of quickly deploying minefields in the Taiwan Strait and key landing approaches, forcing the PLA to reroute or slow amphibious operations.

US weapons

Notable platforms from the United States include:

Anti-Armor weapons, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, which would be used by ground forces to disable PLA armored vehicles and amphibious assault vehicles during landings

Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), such as Stinger missile systems, which would be deployed by infantry units to counter low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones supporting PLA landings.

Coastal Defense and Anti-Ship Missiles, such as harpoon missiles, which can target PLA vessels approaching Taiwan’s shores, disrupting amphibious landings and logistics by forcing the PLA to operate at longer ranges.

Long-Range Precision Artillery, such as HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) which provide precise, mobile fire support against PLA staging areas, airbases, and command centers, disrupting their operations and ability to sustain an invasion

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Systems, such as Patriot missile batteries, which would intercept PLA ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft approaching Taiwan.

Tanks and Armored Vehicles, such as M1A2 Abrams Tanks (108 ordered, deliveries ongoing), which strengthen Taiwan’s ground forces against potential PLA armored breakthroughs and support counterattacks on the ground.

Fighter Jets, such as the F-16V, which provide Taiwan with advanced air combat capabilities, including for interception of PLA aircraft, defensive air operations, and precision strike.

Conclusion

Rather than directly matching the PLA’s scale and firepower, Taiwan’s approach emphasises agility, stealth, and survivability. By deploying smaller, more mobile systems, Taiwan aims to impose disproportionate costs on invading forces. These systems are designed to operate in dispersed, concealed locations, reducing their vulnerability to early detection or preemptive strikes. The shift to asymmetric warfare also aligns with Taiwan’s constrained defence budget and much smaller personnel numbers.  

China’s excessive claims and sensitive areas

Next chapter:

Taiwan’s military preparations