What more can be done to support Taiwan?

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

A stronger Taiwan is a deterrent to Beijing’s unification ambitions. But balancing deterrence with the risk of escalation remains a central challenge for countries seeking to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This dilemma sits at the heart of policymaking for governments navigating the Taiwan question, as they must weigh the risks of supporting Taiwan against the potentially greater risks of inaction.

While supporting Taiwan carries political, economic, and security risks, allowing Beijing to advance its strategic objectives unopposed poses an even greater threat to regional stability. The status quo is not static; it is increasingly dynamic and unstable, shaped by China’s growing military presence, frequent exercises, and coercive tactics. Left unchecked, these incremental changes risk normalising Chinese dominance in the Strait, undermining freedom of navigation, and shifting the balance of power in Beijing’s favour. Maintaining stability therefore requires tangible actions that both strengthen Taiwan’s resilience and increase the costs to China of further escalation.

The United States will remain the primary counterweight to Beijing’s ambitions. Yet its resources are not limitless, and commitments are already stretched across multiple regions, including Europe and the Middle East. Relying solely on the US to deter Chinese coercion and maintain the status quo is insufficient. Broader coalitions of like-minded countries are essential to share the burden, signal collective resolve, and reinforce the credibility of deterrence.  

Regional partnerships and frameworks

Developing more integrated regional partnerships (such as through frameworks proposed by former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner) are essential to push back against Beijing’s advances. Structured frameworks can facilitate deeper integration of regional security strategies, enabling countries to pool capabilities, share burdens, and reinforce each other’s deterrent signals.  

Closer partnerships also facilitate activities such as combined military exercises, joint scenario planning, and real-time intelligence sharing. These measures build not only operational capacity but also political credibility, suggesting to Beijing that coercion against Taiwan could trigger coordinated responses from a broad coalition.

Continued and visible military transits of the Taiwan Strait are also vital. Such transits serve three interlinked purposes: they uphold freedom of navigation under international law, signal international opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo and reaffirm that the Strait is not Beijing’s territorial sea. In doing so, they strike at the heart of China’s efforts to redefine international norms in its favour.

A normalised pattern of transits by like-minded partners, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and European navies, makes it harder for Beijing to claim these operations are provocative or illegitimate. Instead, routine and visible passages establish lawful presence as the norm. This normalisation reassures regional states that navigational freedoms will not erode under Chinese pressure.

Support to Taiwan

Beyond partnerships and multilateral frameworks, more can be done to sustain regional balance by bolstering Taiwan’s security, resilience, and integration into global systems. Support can take many forms; here, the focus is on strengthening Taiwan’s defence and security sectors.

The United States is already Taiwan’s primary security partner, providing arms sales, training, and intelligence sharing. Yet other countries can also discreetly step up within the boundaries of their One-China policies. This diversifies Taiwan’s support base and reinforces the credibility of a global coalition committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

A practical framework for assisting Taiwan’s security can be built around five interlinked pillars: People-to-People Engagement, Technology Cooperation, Diplomatic Support, Training and Resilience, and Shared Planning. Each pillar offers meaningful, scalable actions according to each partner’s political constraints and capacity.

1. People-to-People Engagement

Expanding dialogues and exchanges is a low-risk, high-impact way to enhance mutual understanding and build readiness. Taiwan’s vibrant academic and civil-society networks make it a natural partner for such engagement. Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, bringing together think tanks, academic institutions, and civil society groups, provide valuable opportunities to share experiences, compare approaches, and clarify the nature of Chinese threats, from cyber intrusions to air and maritime coercion.

Personnel exchanges involving retired officers, policy experts, and legislators also create informal but durable channels for sharing security perspectives. Deepening these links ensures that Taiwan’s perspective is better understood abroad, countering Beijing’s efforts to isolate it diplomatically. These networks can also be drawn upon in times of crisis, providing trusted avenues for consultation and coordination.

Models already exist. Canada’s parliamentary friendship groups and Australia’s academic-level security conferences with Taiwan demonstrate how countries can maintain robust unofficial ties while operating within the constraints of their One-China policies.

2. Working Together on New and Emerging Technologies

Taiwan is a leader in advanced manufacturing and a critical node in global supply chains. This position gives it both strategic importance and unique vulnerabilities. As emerging security challenges such as drone warfare and cyber threats reshape the character of conflict, Taiwan and its partners have significant opportunities to pursue joint innovation.

Cooperation on dual-use technologies, such as drones and resilient communications networks, not only strengthens military readiness but also enhances civilian resilience. There is considerable scope to connect Taiwanese research and development hubs with innovation ecosystems in Japan, Europe, and other advanced economies.

Supply-chain security is another vital area for cooperation. Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor production makes it a target during crises. Joint efforts to diversify sourcing, build redundancy, and establish stockpiles of key components can significantly reduce Taiwanese and global vulnerabilities.

3. Diplomatic Support in Vulnerable Regions

China’s influence campaigns have been particularly active in the Pacific Islands, parts of Southeast Asia, and among Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies. Nations can counter Beijing’s efforts by increasing their own diplomatic and development presence in these vulnerable regions. Aligning assistance with Taiwan’s existing programs and priorities offers a credible and attractive alternative to Chinese loans and infrastructure projects.

Support for Taiwan’s participation in international organisations is another crucial dimension. Backing Taipei’s observer status in bodies such as the World Health Organisation and climate-related forums reinforces its role as a responsible stakeholder in the global community.

Quiet but consistent advocacy within ASEAN and other multilateral forums can also help ensure that Taiwan’s concerns (particularly over maritime stability, trade, and economic access) remain on the agenda, even in settings where formal recognition is politically off-limits.

4. Training and Exchanges for Whole-of-Society Resilience

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the world, modern conflict is not just about military capability, it is about the ability of an entire society to absorb shocks and continue functioning during coercion or conflict.

Civil-military integration training is a critical component. Preparing reserve forces and mobilising civil society to support the standing military can significantly enhance Taiwan’s defensive depth. Programs designed to train personnel in logistics and support functions make Taiwan less vulnerable to a single-point failure in the event of a crisis.

Opportunities for Taiwan’s reserve officers, civil-society leaders, and technical specialists to engage with overseas training academies and partner institutions would raise readiness levels and broaden the country’s resilience toolkit. These exchanges allow Taiwan to benefit from the hard-earned lessons of others, whether from Eastern Europe’s experience with hybrid warfare or from regional partners’ expertise in disaster response.

Importantly, states have flexibility in how they deliver this support. Direct military-to-military exchanges are often constrained by diplomatic considerations, but creative alternatives exist. Partnerships between first responders, such as local police, fire brigades, and emergency medical services, offer valuable opportunities to strengthen resilience without breaching political sensitivities.

4. Shared Planning for Maritime and Energy Security

Taiwan’s survival in a crisis depends heavily on its ability to maintain access to sea lanes for energy supplies, food, and other critical imports. This makes shared planning with partner nations on maritime and energy security a vital pillar of resilience.

Partner nations can engage in quiet but meaningful contingency planning with Taiwan across several areas. These include convoy operations to protect commercial shipping, enhanced maritime domain awareness to track and deter coercive activity, and port logistics to ensure supplies can be received and distributed efficiently during a crisis. Such planning helps ensure that, should tensions escalate, Taiwan is not left isolated or unprepared.

Maritime exercises with regional navies add further value. Even when Taiwan is not directly involved, exercises can be structured to test capabilities, such as convoy escort, mine countermeasures, and replenishment at sea, that would be critical in supporting Taiwan during a crisis. This indirect approach allows partners to strengthen relevant operational skills while avoiding diplomatic sensitivities.

Conclusion

The defence and security of Taiwan cannot rest on military deterrence alone. It requires a whole-of-society approach backed by a coalition of international partners. A framework based on people-to-people engagement, technology cooperation, diplomatic support, resilience training, and shared planning offers a practical path forward for countries seeking to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience while managing escalation risks.

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