The United States and several other countries support Taiwan’s defence and security primarily through indirect, carefully calibrated measures. These efforts aim to bolster Taiwan’s self-defence while avoiding steps that might trigger retaliation from Beijing.

The United States

The U.S. is Taiwan’s most important security partner. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington commits to providing Taiwan with the means to defend itself, without making an explicit pledge of direct military intervention.

Arms sales  

U.S. support focuses on helping Taiwan develop a credible, resilient, and cost-effective deterrent. Since 1979, arms sales have covered advanced aircraft, missiles, air-defence systems, and naval assets (see Table 1). These systems are critical for countering potential PLA amphibious, missile, and air campaigns.

Table 1: United States arms transfers to Taiwan, by order year 1979-2024

Military training  

The full scope of US–Taiwan training is not public, but cooperation has expanded in recent years. US National Guard units, Marine Corps trainers, and Security Forces Assistance Brigades operate in Taiwan, with troop levels reaching around 500 personnel in 2025.  

Congressional disclosures confirm that Taiwanese military personnel receive defence and security training in the United States. Taiwanese officers have attended US military institutions such as the Military Academy at West Point, the US Naval Academy and the US Air Force Academy.  

Diplomatic support

High-level visits by U.S. officials surged after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 trip. Since then, bipartisan congressional delegations have visited Taiwan regularly, reinforcing political backing for security cooperation.

Other Countries

While most nations adhere to a “one China” policy, several maintain discreet security ties with Taiwan alongside robust trade and cultural links.

Historical engagement

Singapore maintains a carefully calibrated defence relationship with Taiwan and stations a military attaché at its de facto embassy in Taipei. Singapore has conducted large-scale training in Taiwan under Project Starlight since 1975, using Taiwan’s terrain for infantry, artillery, and armoured exercises. Cooperation has also extended to cyber defence and UAV research.

Israel built a complex defence relationship with Taiwan from the 1970s to the early 1990s, supplying anti-ship missiles, radar, and other advanced systems worth an estimated US$852 million.

In Europe, France supplied frigates and fighter jets before halting new arms sales in 1994 under Chinese pressure. The Netherlands built two Zwaardvis-class submarines for Taiwan in the 1980s, prompting Beijing to recall its ambassador in protest..

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 1979 and 2024 at least 11 UN member states transferred military-relevant systems to Taiwan, including the UK, Switzerland, Japan, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Canada, and Singapore (see Table 2). These ranged from missiles and radars to naval vessels and aircraft engines.

Table 2: Arms transfers to Taiwan, by order year 1979-2024

Emerging engagement

Rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and increasingly assertive Chinese military activity have prompted more countries to explore ways to support Taiwan’s security, including through discreet defence and security engagement.

In the Indo-Pacific, stability in the Taiwan Strait is seen as directly tied to national defence interests. Japan now reportedly maintains an active-duty defence attaché in Taipei, and official defence statements increasingly frame Taiwan’s security as integral to Japan’s own. The Philippines under President Marcos Jr. has reportedly loosened restrictions on government contacts with Taiwanese officials and increased operational coordination. The Philippine Coast Guard has conducted joint patrols with Taiwan’s Coast Guard in the Bashi Channel, a strategic waterway between the two territories.

In Europe, Russia’s war in Ukraine has heightened concerns about authoritarian expansionism, prompting countries like the UK, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic to strengthen cooperation with Taiwan. This includes defence-technology partnerships, cyber security exchanges, and training initiatives. While often kept low-profile to avoid triggering strong Chinese retaliation, these measures signal growing political alignment with Taiwan’s democratic values and recognition of its role in global supply chain security.

Although both Australia and Canada adhere to their respective “one China” policies, they are increasingly exploring ways to support Taiwan’s defence and security within the limits of their diplomatic frameworks. Canberra has stepped up diplomatic support for stability in the Taiwan Strait and deepened engagement with Taipei through intelligence and cyber security exchanges.   Canada has similarly increased low-profile engagement with Taipei. While avoiding formal military engagements, Canada has deepened technology exchanges, cybersecurity cooperation, and diplomatic support for regional stability.  

China’s response to countries supporting Taiwan

The PRC firmly opposes countries supporting Taiwan’s defence and security. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has labelled such moves, particularly by the US, as violations of its commitment not to support ‘Taiwan independence’ and an erroneous signal to ‘Taiwan independence' separatist forces.  Beijing has suspended military exchanges and nuclear talks with the US over this issue and sanctioned several US defence companies for their alleged involvement.  

In rare cases, Beijing has taken punitive economic and diplomatic measures against countries that challenge its territorial claims over Taiwan. In 2021, Bejing halted trade and downgraded diplomatic relations with Lithuania to the ‘charge d’affaires’ level after the Baltic state allowed Taiwan to establish a de facto embassy in Vilnius.