China’s large scale exercises since 2022

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

Several nations have claims in the South China Sea, but China’s are by far the most extensive and controversial. The PRC uses its military to try to enforce sovereign rights and jurisdiction over features within the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, including the islands, rocks and atolls that make up the Paracel and Spratly islands. That’s despite a 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal, which found that China’s Nine-Dash Line claim has no basis in international law.

The PRC also uses its military to deter other countries from operating in areas that it deems as ‘sensitive’. That includes using its military to deter other countries from approaching its contiguous zone—a region of sea that extends 12 nautical miles beyond a nation’s territorial waters. China’s military acts assertively when any foreign military operates close to its territory, especially major military installations.

Scroll below and click on the separate yellow headings in the text boxes below to move between analysis of excessive claims / sensitive areas and legal considerations.

Drills (4-7 August 2022)

On 2 August 2022, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, the highest-level American official to do so in 25 years. Beijing condemned the visit as a “major political provocation” and announced unprecedented large-scale military exercises around Taiwan from 4 to 7 August.

For the first time, the PLA conducted joint operations that completely encircled Taiwan. The PLA Rocket Force launched 11 ballistic missiles, some flying over Taiwan and landing in waters to the island’s east. Several missiles reportedly fell within Japan’s EEZ.

The PLA established six designated exclusion zones. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported 68 PLA aircraft and 13 PLA Navy vessels operating in the region. Of those aircraft, 49 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, far surpassing previous records.

Joint Sword 2023 (8-10 April 2023)

In April 2023, Taiwan’s President Tsai transited through the US and held an in-person meeting with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. Beijing condemned the meeting as collusion between “Taiwan independence forces” and external actors. In retaliation, the PLA launched a major exercise, codenamed Joint Sword, from 8 to 10 April. Chinese state media described the drills as a direct warning to Taipei and Washington.

The exercises focused on precision strikes and an aerial blockade of Taiwan. The PLA’s aircraft carrier Shandong operated off Taiwan’s southeastern coast, launching fighters and coordinating with destroyers that reportedly approached as close as 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s shoreline.

On 10 April, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported a record-high number of PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan. A total of 91 aircraft and 12 vessels were detected, with 54 aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line or entering Taiwan’s ADIZ.

No official exclusion zones were declared, but PLA likely ship positions are indicated.

Joint Sword 2024A (23-24 May 2024)

On 23 May 2024, just three days after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration and his remarks underscoring Taiwan’s sovereignty, China launchedJoint Sword-2024A. Beijing described the two-day exercise as “a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”

The exercise took place across the Taiwan Strait, around Taiwan proper, and in the vicinity of several outlying islands. For the first time, the exercise was accompanied by “comprehensive law enforcement operations” conducted by the China Coast Guard around Taiwan’s offshore islands.

Chinese issued five exercise zones around Taiwan and four around outlying islands. The exercise reportedly included up to 111 aircraft and 46 naval vessels encircling Taiwan. Approximately 82 PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line, with some approaching as close as the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.

Joint Sword 2024B (14 October 2024)

On 14 October 2024, just four days after President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech declaring that “China has no right to represent Taiwan,” the PLA launchedJoint Sword-2024B. Beijing described the one-day operation as a “stern warning” against so-called “separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces.”

According to a PLA spokesperson, the exercise centred on joint sea-air combat patrols, the blockade and control of key ports, and simulated strikes on sea and land targets. The Chinese Coast Guard again played a visible role, dispatching four flotillas to conduct “law enforcement patrols” around Taiwan. The Liaoning aircraft carrier, operating as part of a carrier battle group, was deployed to the island’s east-southeast.

The PLA declared six exercise zones for the Joint Sword‑2024B. These zones overlapped with Taiwan’s contiguous zones representing a notable escalation from earlier exercises A record 153 PLA aircraft, 14 naval vessels, and 12 Coast Guard ships were reported operating near Taiwan, the highest single-day count of Chinese aircraft activity to date.

Drills (9-11 December 2024)

Soon after President Lai Ching-te returned from a diplomatic tour  of Pacific allies, which included transit stops in Hawaii and Guam, the PLA launched a large-scale exercise. Unlike earlier drills, these manoeuvres were not publicly named or formally announced by Beijing.

The exercise featured around 90 naval and coast guard vessels operating across an expansive area: waters around Taiwan, the southern Japanese islands, and sections of both the East and South China Seas. This represented a significant geographic expansion compared with earlier drills, simulating operations to block foreign intervention across the First Island Chain and east of Taiwan.

The PLA announced seven restricted airspace zones from 9-11 December, while simultaneously conducting operations around and east of the island. The exercise was reportedly the PRC’s largest maritime operation since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The CCG again played a central role, with three vessels, including one of its largest, sailing east of Taiwan.

Strait Thunder 2025A (1-2 April 2025) 

On 13 March 2025, President Lai Ching-te outlined 17 strategies to strengthen Taiwan’s national security. Less than three weeks later, on 1 April, the PLA launched Strait Thunder-2025A. Chinese officials framed the exercise as a direct response to what they described as provocative policies by Lai’s pro-independence administration.

The exercise focused on regional control, blockade operations, and precision strike scenarios. The CCG played an active role, conducting coordinated boarding and blockade operations. Analysts highlighted the emergence of a dual-layer “cabbage strategy”: an inner ring of maritime militia, coast guard, and naval forces encircling Taiwan, and an outer ring designed to harass foreign military forces seeking to intervene.

The PLA declared Strait Thunder 2025A would take place in the middle and southern sea areas of the Taiwan Strait. The Shandong aircraft carrier group participated, maneuvering within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan, its closest approach to date. In total, the PLA deployed 135 aircraft, 38 naval vessels, and 12 official vessels, underscoring the growing scale and complexity of its joint-force operations.

China’s excessive claims and sensitive areas